Morgan Stanley/LuxeConsult - Ninth Annual Swiss Watcher 2025/2026
The Swiss watch industry's middle class is disappearing. A dive into the 2026 Morgan Stanley report, from Omega's fall to #5 to the independent brands punching above their weight.
Before we begin…
Nope, you are not imagining things, and yes, you have received this essay before - on 19 February 2026, to be precise. If you received it back then, you got the original cut; lucky you.
Unfortunately, the original post was taken down due to a copyright infringement notice on behalf of Oliver Müller − founder of LuxeConsult and the man behind the estimated numbers in the annual Morgan Stanley / LuxeConsult Swiss Watcher report.
Here is the email I received:
Fair enough. I respect Oliver Müller’s intellectual property rights, and believe it or not, I do take copyright seriously. The original essay included some his charts from the Ninth Annual Swiss Watcher report, which I used to illustrate the analysis. All charts have now been removed from the revised essay below, and if you want to see them, the full report is - and this was the case all along - floating around the collector community in roughly the same way that oxygen and nitrogen float around the atmosphere.
Which brings me to some other observations.
The Morgan Stanley / LuxeConsult report is, without question, one of the most widely referenced source of brand-level revenue estimates in the Swiss watch industry. It has earned that position through years of consistent methodology, professional presentation, and the fact that literally nobody else publishes anything comparable. I have personally covered this report on SDC for years, recommended it to readers, and probably driven more interest in it within the community than Oliver would care to admit.
The value of this report is almost entirely a function of its penetration and adoption within the industry. The more people who read it, discuss it, and reference it, the more ‘indispensable’ it becomes. That is how influence works. You would think that an independent newsletter doing a detailed analytical breakdown − with attribution − would be welcomed as free marketing. Apparently, you would think wrong.
I will take this opportunity to remind you what this report actually is. These are estimates. Also known as educated guesses. Nobody at LuxeConsult has access to the audited financials of Rolex, Patek, AP, or any of the privately held brands that make this report interesting. Oliver and the Morgan Stanley team practice what you might call a dark art of triangulation… they look at Swiss export data, estimate wholesale-to-retail splits, talk to component suppliers, and then arrive at numbers that are presented with a confidence that somewhat exceeds the underlying precision.
How imprecise do you think this report could be? Well, I will give you one easy example.
In the Eighth Annual Swiss Watcher report (covering 2024 data), Morgan Stanley and LuxeConsult estimated that Tudor’s sales had catastrophically tanked by -34% to CHF 360 million. They explicitly crowned (lol!) Tudor “the worst performer in 2024 amongst the top 50 Swiss watch brands we track.”
Fast forward one year to the Ninth Annual Swiss Watcher report. Tudor’s 2025 sales are now reported as CHF 460 million, which the analysts casually describe as “+2% on our revised estimates of CHF 450mn in 2024.”
What the fvck is that? The 2024 figure went from CHF 360 million to CHF 450 million between one report and the next; Not even David Blaine himself can conjure 90 million in revenue back into existence; and a purportedly disastrous -34% decline was casually revised to a bad-but-quite-survivable -17% decline. Did they explain this? Fvck no. They dropped the phrase ‘revised estimates’ into a parenthesis and kept chugging on, with aplomb. I guess when you are covering a secretive private entity like the Hans Wilsdorf Foundation, one of the perks is that nobody is going to issue a press release correcting your made up nonsense. So you just... adjust, and move on.
I have been fond of this report and have always appreciated the effort that goes into it, but we need to be proportionate about is being protected here. These are not state secrets, nor proprietary trading algorithms. They are someone’s best guess at numbers that the actual companies themselves refuse to publish − presented in chart form and wrapped in a Morgan Stanley cover page.
So look, out of respect for Oliver Müller’s wishes, all charts have been removed from this essay - I have noted the exhibit number of each chart from the report, so you can look them up easily. The analysis and commentary remains unchanged. If you want to cross-reference the underlying data, the report is readily available through the usual channels.
Going forward, I will no longer be covering or recommending the Morgan Stanley / LuxeConsult Swiss Watcher reports on SDC. Oliver is of course well within his rights to control how his work is distributed, and I am entirely within mine to decide that life is too short to deal with pedants. He can enjoy his fictions in peace, and I wish him well with that.
Right then. On with the show. Again.
Original post from 19 February starts here
👋 Well hello, degenerates!
It is that time of year again; the watch world’s version of an earnings call, but with unnecessarily long PDF files and a fair bit of celebrating “doing alright despite the tough market” (unless you work for the Swatch Group lol!).
Morgan Stanley and LuxeConsult have published their Ninth Annual Swiss Watcher, which covers the story of Swiss watches in 2025. Note: I use “2025/2026” for my own tracking - i.e. “analysis of 2025, published in 2026”
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Estimated Reading Time ~20 minutes
Executive summary
Morgan Stanley and LuxeConsult’s Ninth Annual Swiss Watcher report covers the 2025 calendar year. The Swiss watch market contracted for the second consecutive year (-1.7% in export value), and volumes hit a multi-decade low of 14.6 million units; this is roughly half the 2011 peak. Revenue held up because the industry continued an shift toward premium pricing - watches above CHF 50,000 retail accounted for over a third of export value and 89% of all growth, despite representing just 1.4% of units shipped.
The major headline is that Omega fell to #5 by turnover, overtaken by AP and Patek. Rolex crossed CHF 11 billion in wholesale sales and now exceeds Apple Watch revenues at retail level. The four largest privately owned brands (Rolex, Patek, AP, Richard Mille) captured roughly 76% of the industry’s total profit pool.
Swatch Group was the biggest market share loser for the sixth consecutive year, shedding another 220 basis points. Longines dropped below CHF 1 billion for the first time in over a decade and may now be loss-making. Cartier was the only listed-brand outlier, growing +10% to CHF 3.5 billion. Christopher Ward and MB&F both entered the Top 50 for the first time.
In this post, we’ll break down major brand performance with charts and a full comparative data table, we will cover the Grand Seiko threat, the pricing pressure from tariffs and currency moves, what Van Cleef & Arpels’ surge means for the future of watch design, and what all of this might mean for you as a collector.
Monopoly money
The Swiss watch market contracted for the second year in a row, down -1.7% in export value. Retail value settled around CHF 49bn, but that headline number glosses over the fact that “volume” is really going down the drain.
Exports dropped to 14.6 million units, and this is a multi-decade low. To put that in perspective, in 2011, the industry shipped nearly 30 million watches. We have effectively halved the output of the industry in 15 years, but hey, for now, revenue is up!
So the obvious question is, why does nobody in Biel or Le Brassus seem particularly worried? The answer must be “premiumisation” which has been coming up all too often; watches with a retail price tag above 50k are said to have accounted for over a third of the total value of Swiss watch exports and a staggering 89% of total growth - despite making up only 1.4% of the volume in units. This is rather insane if you think about it; the industry is gentrifying itself 😵.
Exhibit 5 and 6 - now removed.
America Pays, China Fades
For years, the Swiss watch industry was practically a derivative of the Chinese economy… ok fine, that’s an exaggeration, but either way, that era is over for now.
In 2025, exports to Greater China went down but I can’t seem to figure out why the MS report figures (below) do not align with the Swiss Export data (above) - possibly a methodology difference between FHS wrist-watch-only data and broader customs figures, but I’m guessing here. Either way, China’s share of total Swiss watch exports has dropped by about half between 2012 and 2025, and the US maintained its position as the biggest export market even with a slight dip in 2025.
Exhibit 9 and 10 - now removed.
Power dynamics
There may well be a few hundred Swiss watch brands, but in the grand scheme of things, only a handful of them seem to move the needle on a macro level; everyone else is fighting for table scraps. Also, you may have seen other headlines about Omega’s fall from grace, but there are two ways to look at who runs this industry, and the report uses both.
Exhibit 1 - now removed. But below is an approximate estimation of market share in 2025, at retail value. This is not a reproduction of anyone’s data. You can check 😂
By total market share (retail value), the top four brands as you can see in the chart, are Rolex, Cartier, AP, and Omega - they account for 55% of the entire market, up from 52.4% in 2024. Omega is still in that top four!
But if you look at it by turnover ranking, the hierarchy has changed. Omega has dropped to #5, overtaken by both AP and Patek Philippe. The new top five by revenue: Rolex (CHF 11bn), Cartier (CHF 3.5bn), AP (CHF 2.6bn), Patek (CHF 2.5bn), and Omega (CHF 2.2bn).
And then there’s the stat that really stings. The four largest privately owned brands — Rolex, Patek, AP, and Richard Mille — now control a combined 49.1% market share. Their combined operating margin sits around 33%, and they captured roughly 76% of the entire industry’s profit pool (~CHF 7.9bn total). The publicly traded groups (Swatch, Richemont, LVMH) have a combined ~41% of sales, but they get a much smaller slice of the actual profits. Private brands are eating public companies alive.
Exhibit 31 and 32 - now removed.
Omega’s fall
This is the so-called ‘big news’ table which shows Omega, the perennial podium finisher, fell by two positions to #5 by turnover.
Exhibit 2 - now removed.
Sales dropped ~ -8% year-on-year and volumes fell ~ -9%; Exhibit 3 and 4 - now removed.
When Morgan Stanley started this report based on 2017 data, Omega held roughly 9% global market share and Rolex was at 23%. Here we are, 8 years later, and Omega sits at 6.4% and Rolex has grown to 32.9%. Hardly surprising to some… but probably surprising to their CEO, who once thought Omega would catch up to, and perhaps overtake Rolex lol!
MS reckons Omega’s got a positioning problem; that it tries to be too many things to too many people, and really just ends up not being the key thing in any category. They promote technical credentials through METAS-certified chronometry and anti-magnetism, which puts them up against Rolex - they can’t beat them, so they’re more of a ‘fast follower’ here. Then, they also chase a lifestyle narrative aimed at younger (and female) consumers, where it competes against Cartier (who has stronger design credentials and simpler messaging). Managing multiple positioning pillars at once dilutes brand clarity, and the market is punishing that confusion.
While branding is definitely part of the problem, the data points to other quantitative reasons for Omega’s underperformance. Morgan Stanley estimates that Omega contributed roughly 80% of the Swatch Group’s Watches & Jewellery divisional operating profit in 2025, up from ~75% the year before. Several other Swatch Group brands experienced steep drops in profitability, so Omega is carrying an increasingly heavy load for a building with more and more cracks in its foundation - in other words, it is being forced to act like a cash cow and make short term decisions (at the expense of long term ones, which might not necessarily generate cash immediately).
On the bright side, Omega has trimmed its catalogue from around 1,400 SKUs seven years ago to approximately 850 today. They launched roughly 65 new SKUs in 2025, and management highlighted strong Q4 momentum, particularly in the US (but in reality, the consolidated full-year data tells a less encouraging story). For comparison, Rolex has around ~450 SKUs despite generating 4x the turnover.
Exhibit 19 - now removed.
Rolex is a juggernaut
I feel like whenever Rolex is discussed in the context of the Swiss watch industry, this video should be playing in the background:
The numbers are almost boring in their sheer dominance; wholesale sales up +4% to 11 billion and volume down -2% to 1.15 million units. This is Rolex’s second consecutive year of declining volumes, and the report notes this is the first time in over 20 years that Rolex volumes dropped for two consecutive years. The growth came from a +6% increase in Average Selling Price (ASP) to ~CHF 14,000 (which is up roughly +50% since 2019). They assert that Rolex is deliberately restricting supply as the price creeps upward, and this is a strategy that, annoyingly for the rest of us, works perfectly when you have the strongest brand equity in the industry.
At retail (~CHF 16bn / USD 20.6bn), Rolex exceeds Apple Watch revenues (~USD 19bn), reinforcing its leadership not only within Swiss watchmaking but across the broader global watch market.
Isn’t that nuts? A company making mechanical wristwatches is outselling the world’s largest tech company’s wearable. In 2025 no less. I think the kids call that ‘unfuckwithable’.
The big product story was the Land-Dweller, which launched at Watches and Wonders with the new Dynapulse escapement. You can say what you like about the polarising design (and many of you did), but the significance of that launch was the new movement which positions Rolex ‘more directly’ against Omega’s Co-Axial escapement. Rolex is essentially building an industrial moat; proprietary tech that reinforces its position as the king of “mass-produced, but still cares about chronometry.”
As SDC regulars will know, the CPO programme keeps expanding. Nearly one quarter of Rolex’s global authorised dealer network (approximately 1,360 points of sale) now operates a CPO department. Watches of Switzerland CEO recently indicated that Rolex CPO has become the group’s second-largest revenue channel, accounting for ~5% of WoS’ turnover, ahead of Patek Philippe at ~3.5%. Rolex has effectively monetised the secondary market without actually selling used watches themselves.
Exhibit 33 and 34 - now removed.
Tudor reality check
At face value, seeing Tudor hit CHF 460m in 2025 looks like a massive jump from the CHF 360m reported in 2024, as it appears to be a +28% recovery! Except, Morgan Stanley seems to have revised their 2024 baseline. The report actually states that Tudor posted sales “up +2% on our revised estimates of CHF 450mn in 2024.” So it is a +2% growth story, not some kind of miracle comeback. Still, Tudor is doing something smart, which is to actively reduce its reliance on China by shifting the catalogue heavily toward the Pelagos and Black Bay families while also phasing out collections (like Clair de Rose) that were supposedly aimed at the Chinese market.
Volumes fell -10% to around 180,000 units, but ASP hit ~CHF 4,100, (up roughly +50% since 2019). Tudor, like everyone else, is pushing value over volume. It climbed four spots to #17 in the top 20 and gained 30bps of market share.
Richard Mille rocking
If Rolex is the undisputed king of the industry, Richard Mille is perhaps the apex predator of the ultra-high-net-worth ecosystem. In 2025, the brand retained its #6 ranking by turnover, but the underlying metrics are frankly absurd when compared to traditional industrial watchmaking.
Richard Mille generated an estimated CHF 1.75 billion in sales, but they achieved that turnover by selling just 5,950 watches, at an Average Selling Price (ASP) of roughly CHF 294,000. So, to generate the same amount of revenue as one average Richard Mille transaction, Tissot has to sell roughly 630 watches!
RM’s permanent collection comprises only 29 SKUs, so if I did the maths correctly, that is roughly ~ 200 pieces per reference annually, which translates to fewer than five units per reference per year, across ~40 boutiques. Pretty insane business, for sure.
Swatch Group is bleeding out
If you hold UHR shares, I guess this is some food for thought. Swatch Group was, once again, the industry’s main market share “donor.” Their market share dropped another -220bps to 16.1%. Since 2019, they have lost over 1,000 basis points of market share. When compared to 2019, Swatch Group sales are down -23.8% on a cumulative basis. In that same period, Swiss watch exports are up +17.5%. Every single one of the Group’s top five brands posted a sales decline in 2025.
Omega fell -8% to CHF 2.2bn. Longines cratered -18% to CHF 920m, dropping below CHF 1bn for the first time in over a decade. The report explicitly calls Longines the Swatch Group’s ‘main problem child’ and believes the brand may have become loss-making in 2025. Longines’ market share has more than halved from 6.7% in 2019 to 3.1% and its upward price repositioning (ASP up ~50% since 2019 to ~CHF 1,900) has opened up space below for competitors like Frédérique Constant and a growing army of microbrands to target value-minded buyers.
Tissot fell -5% to CHF 720m and is dangerously dependent on the PRX line, which now represents an estimated 60% of brand sales. That kind of concentration in a single product family raises questions about future growth.
The Swatch brand itself saw sales drop -15% to CHF 474m, with volume down -10%. As you know, MoonSwatch hype has already faded. Breguet and Blancpain both saw steep profitability declines. The report is quite blunt about the outlook here:
Going forward, we expect most investors to not find the long-term narrative on Swatch Group compelling and we expect the Group will continue to underperform the Swiss watch market in 2026.
Yeah, no shit! The Swatch Group still accounts for ~60% of total Swiss watch industry volume (approximately 8.8 million watches), which means they have an oversized manufacturing base in a market that is “premiumising” away from everything they do best. Omega, Longines, and Tissot account for ~71% of the Group’s sales and an even greater share of profits. Out of 16 watch brands, several have become relatively immaterial to group finances (Breguet, which used to matter, is now at just 2.6% of group sales).
Exhibit 29 and 30 - now removed.
Exhibit 23 and 24 - now removed.
Cartier carrying Richemont
Cartier is doing something unusual, in that it is the only brand owned by a publicly traded group that is consistently gaining share in a market dominated by private players.
Sales grew +10% to CHF 3.5bn and market share expanded +70bps to 8.7%, which is now up +300bps since 2019. Cartier combines luxury credibility with relative accessibility (entry-level watches start at ~CHF 3,150) and benefits from strong design equity across iconic collections like the Tank, Santos, and Panthère. It is the fifth-largest volume driver in the entire Swiss watch industry just behind Omega.
But the truth is, Cartier is carrying the rest of Richemont, and the weight is showing elsewhere. Richemont’s Specialist Watchmakers division lost another -60bps of market share (down to 7.6%), now -270bps below 2019 levels. The story within Richemont is one of divergence where Cartier (+10%) and Van Cleef & Arpels (+13%) are thriving, and the other watch-only brands struggled - well, except for IWC.
Before COVID, IWC was the Specialist Watchmakers’ largest brand with annual sales approaching CHF 700m. In 2025, Morgan Stanley estimates IWC sales at CHF 573m - a distant second within the division to Vacheron (CHF 914m). IWC did return to growth (+5% YoY), and this is quite encouraging, but the long-term trajectory tells a less than rosy story.
Exhibit 27 and 28 - now removed.
If you are a traditional Swiss watch executive, the 2025 numbers from Van Cleef & Arpels must be terrifying. In a year where total Swiss watch exports contracted by -1.7% and historic pure-play watchmakers were bleeding volume, Van Cleef & Arpels saw its watch sales surge by +13% to CHF 335 million.
What we might be witnessing is some sort of “aesthetic pivot”, particularly among younger demographics and Gen Z. MS explicitly notes a trend toward “sculptural, design-led timepieces,” characterised by the media as “the return of the bangle watch.” Consumers appear to be engaging with brands whose designs resonate with the strong aesthetic codes of the 1960s to 1980s. Cartier’s Baignoire and Crash models have effectively become reference pieces for a new generation of fashion-conscious collectors, and this would support a belief that Gen Z is actively moving toward design over mechanics. Van Cleef & Arpels perfectly rides this wave, because their watches are natural extensions of their high-jewelry ecosystems - they are luxury signalling tools first, and timekeepers second.
Maybe Berneron was onto something when he said his next release will be a jewellery piece; I’m going to ask for an allocation and treat it like a bitcoin gamble 😂.
By the way, the worst percentage decline in the entire list was within Richemont’s Specialist Watchmakers division. Panerai suffered a -31% collapse in turnover, dropping from CHF 433 million in 2024 down to just CHF 299 million in 2025. This was driven entirely by a mirrored -31% collapse in volume, with unit sales falling from 55,000 down to 38,000. So it seems like Panerai’s collapse provides the missing context for why Richemont’s Specialist Watchmakers division performed so poorly overall.
AP boosted by anniversary
AP celebrated its 150th anniversary in 2025 and backed it up with record numbers. Estimated sales reached CHF 2.6bn, up +9% year-on-year, making AP the third-largest Swiss watch manufacturer by turnover for the first time in its history above both Patek and Omega.
The anniversary editions were produced in limited quantities and generated strong demand. The Royal Oak Perpetual Calendar Openworked ‘150th Anniversary’ was limited to 150 pieces globally (i.e. fewer than two per point of sale) which reinforced the usual scarcity dynamics and secondary market strength. AP was one of the few brands to see secondary market price resilience in 2025, with an estimated +2.3% increase.
The “single-brand” risk is still a topic, though. The Royal Oak accounts for an estimated 88% of total sales. AP is the only leading luxury brand in the world that generates more than 80% of revenue from one product line. The Neo Frame collection (Whoop meme) with a rectangular case and jumping-hour complication, is basically another attempt to diversify beyond the Royal Oak architecture - but adoption will take time.
Sales have more than quadrupled from ~CHF 630m in 2012 to CHF 2.6bn in 2025 (Thanks FHB?!). The brand has fully exited the multi-brand wholesale channel and now operates through approximately 76 points of sale, with ~90% of sales generated via mono-brand boutiques.
So… provided the world never falls out of love with the Royal Oak, AP have essentially built the perfect, high-margin luxury mousetrap!
Patek still dominating
Patek ranked #4 by turnover with estimated sales of ~CHF 2.5bn (+9%), but it is actually #3 by retail market share at 7.0% (ahead of both AP (5.6%) and Omega (6.4%)). The gap between wholesale and retail numbers matters because Patek sells almost entirely through third-party retailers (wholesale), and AP sells mostly through its own stores (retail).
Production remained stable at roughly 72,000 watches, but ASP increased ~9% to approximately CHF 47,400. Patek continues to be, as far as anyone knows, the only major luxury watch brand that employs zero brand ambassadors and sponsors zero cultural or sports activities. They supposedly prefer to invest their marketing budget in craftsmanship events like the ‘Rare Handcrafts’ exhibitions and Thierry’s dictator-style speeches + dinners.
An interesting stat that deserves your attention, is that Patek’s retail market share of 7.0% is now larger than the entire LVMH Watch Group’s share (5.3%). One family-owned brand from Geneva outsells the combined watch activities of TAG Heuer, Hublot, Zenith, Bulgari, Louis Vuitton, and Dior. That’s pretty crazy, no?
With Watches & Wonders looming, we can’t forget that 2026 marks the 50th anniversary of the Nautilus. Given collector demand and what happened with the Cubitus launch, you can probably expect 2026 to be another record year for Peter Griffin Thierry Stern.
Pricing pressure cooker
SDC covered how US tariffs fluctuated wildly during 2025… initially 31%, then 10%, then 39%, before settling at 15%. That 15% is more manageable than 39%, but it is still massively above the prior 2-2.5% level. On top of that, the Swiss franc appreciated ~15% against the dollar, and gold prices surged ~65% year-on-year. If you are wondering why your favourite gold Rolex went up 8-9% in 2025 while the steel models were up 5-6%, there’s your answer i.e. probably all three things… cost pressure, margin expansion, and Rolex simply testing what the market will bear.
Brands are facing a major dilemma right now, as they try to figure out how much to pass on to consumers (and how quickly to do so). If they get it wrong in one direction they will crush demand, and in the other direction, they will destroy margins. My take on this, is that they should simply reduce production and hold prices firm, so they can correct the (over)supply problem. I accept that reducing production means laying off Swiss workers, and this is politically toxic in Switzerland and practically quite difficult for groups like Swatch that have vertically integrated manufacturing…but hey, what do I know.
Independents
The corporate giants seem to struggle, but the independents continue to punch above their weight.
Christopher Ward entered the Top 50 at #48 with CHF 51m in sales (ASP of ~CHF 1,300) and roughly +50% growth. They run a 100% direct-to-consumer model, they produce under the Swiss Made hallmark, and they are doing what the Swatch Group mid-tier should be doing - offering compelling watches at accessible prices with a distinct design identity and strong community engagement.
MB&F entered at #47 with CHF 52m in sales. Max Büsser has officially scaled ‘crazy things’ into a serious business. With an ASP of approximately CHF 167,000 and production of just 420 pieces, this is the polar opposite of a volume play.
F.P. Journe (#36) and H. Moser & Cie (#37) are now neck-and-neck at CHF ~105m in revenue each. These brands have successfully graduated from ‘niche curiosity’ to ‘institutional-grade independent.’ Journe’s stated ASP of ~CHF 65,000 with 1,900 pieces produced tells you nothing about the brand’s strategy. Most people have a number of 1,000 in their mind as Journe’s cap on production, but this is for mechanical watches as far as I am aware. The numbers might therefore be a little skewed for Journe, where the ASP for mechanical watches is probably over CHF 100,000 but I can’t speak to this authoritatively.
Raymond Weil rose to #39 which is a notable achievement in the hyper-competitive mid-price segment. Together with Christopher Ward, they prove that scalability is indeed possible for independents, even outside the ultra-high-end.
Grand Seiko threat
The Swiss watch industry is essentially a cartel based on geography. If you manage to stamp “Swiss Made” on a dial, you get to participate in a fortified ecosystem where 96% of all global luxury watch sales (defined as anything with a retail price over CHF 2,000) currently happen. It is a very nice, very deep moat. But every so often, someone from outside the moat decides to build a super precise, aggressively polished boat.
GS are not in this report’s Top 50 list because they are Japanese, but Morgan Stanley estimates Grand Seiko did CHF 210m in sales with around 50,000 units in 2025. If they were Swiss, that would rank them approximately #27, ahead of Swiss darlings like Jacob & Co. (CHF 180m), Louis Vuitton (CHF 165m), and Journe or Moser (~ CHF 105m).
With an ASP of ~ CHF 6,880, you get an idea of whose lunch Grand Seiko is trying to eat… Omega, of course, and here’s a funny stat -in 2025, Omega’s ASP was an eerily similar CHF 6,822!
LVMH unclear
LVMH dropped from fifth to sixth-largest Swiss watch group with 5.3% share (-20bps). The pure watch brands all declined… TAG Heuer (-2%), Hublot (-7%), Zenith (-15%), Bulgari (- 18%). The bright spots were actually the fashion-adjacent brands i.e Louis Vuitton (+9%), and Dior (+3%).
Louis Vuitton’s strategy was to kill volume (-50% YoY to just 12,000 units) and push ASP to CHF 13,750. Jean Arnault continues to build up his horological credibility, and the brand is clearly trying to position itself as a serious player and not a fashion accessory. Whether the market will accept that repositioning over time is an open question, but the ambition and intent is clear. We will wait and see, I guess.
Other insights
A few more things buried in the report which you might like to know…
Rolex CPO is bigger than Patek at Watches of Switzerland; Rolex CPO accounts for ~5% of turnover, ahead of Patek at ~3.5%. Rolex accounts for roughly 52% of total WoS turnover which, in general, might be described as the tail wagging the dog.
Smartwatches are stalling; the Apple Watch Ultra 3 launch quarter revenues were -45% lower than the Ultra 2. Even Apple has discovered the proverbial ceiling of “wrist real estate.”
The ‘Billionaire’s Club’ is shrinking; in 2023, eight brands made more than CHF 1bn. In 2024, Vacheron fell out. In 2025, Longines got kicked out. The club now has just six members… Rolex, Cartier, AP, Patek, Omega, and Richard Mille. My prediction is that Omega will drop out in the coming years; Omega would need to fall below ~CHF 1.75bn (RM’s current level) or RM would need to grow past CHF 2.2bn. Given RM grew +13% YoY, this isn’t impossible within 2-3 years.
Within the Top 50, 29 brands declined year-on-year, of which 14 posted double-digit drops. Seven of those belong to Swatch Group, suggesting problems that go beyond cyclical weakness into structural positioning issues.
Comparing with last year’s data
Source: Morgan Stanley / LuxeConsult estimates (Eighth and Ninth Annual Swiss Watcher Reports) - but I made this table in Excel myself.
Notes:
Christopher Ward was not in the 2024 Top 50. The 2025 report states ~50% sales growth, so the 2024 figures are back-calculated estimates.
Bell & Ross was not in the 2024 Top 50 (Parmigiani held #49 at CHF 50m). 2024 figures are estimates.
Tudor 2024 figure of CHF 360m is the original estimate from the Eighth Annual report. The Ninth Annual report revised the 2024 baseline to CHF 450m, which makes Tudor’s actual growth ~ +2% (not ~ +28%).
Parmigiani dropped out of the Top 50 in 2025 (was #49 in 2024 at CHF 50m). The report notes a ~30% decline in sales.
Baume & Mercier dropped out of the Top 50 in 2025 (was #41 in 2024 at CHF 69m).
Retail market share figures for brands below 1% are shown as 0.00% per the report’s rounding convention.
Closing remarks
This report was more like a eulogy for the middle class of watchmaking. The industry is shedding volume, gentrifying aggressively, and concentrating power in fewer hands every year. I spent all of last year talking about the great bifurcation… basically, this report is the evidence².
The privately owned brands have built a fortress, pulled up the drawbridge, and are currently pouring boiling oil on the Swatch Group below. Cartier is the only listed-brand exception, and even that is largely a jewellery-maison story that happens to sell watches quite well.
For you as a collector, the takeaway is that the primary market is pricing you out, and the secondary market is split between brands that hold value and brands that lose 30-40% the moment you walk out the door. What this means is, unless you are buying into the top tier, you are buying something the industry itself does not seem particularly interested in supporting long-term.
Whether that matters to you probably depends on why you collect in the first place. If you are in it for the craft, the story, and the joy of wearing something you love, none of this changes anything. If you are in it with an ‘investment’ mindset, maybe check which side of the drawbridge you are standing on.
Buy what you love, but keep your eyes focused on where the industry’s priorities lie.
Fuck ‘em.